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DEBUGGING THE TALLINN MANUAL 2.0’S
APPLICATION OF THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE TO
CYBER OPERATIONS
Colin Patrick*
Abstract: As global cyber connectivity increases, so does opportunities for largescale nefarious cyber operations. These novel circumstances have necessitated the
application of old-world customs to an increasingly complex world. To meet this challenge,
the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations was
created. The Manual provides 154 black letter rules detailing how international law applies
to cyber operations during peacetime. Of particular import is the Manual’s interpretation
of the due diligence principle. This principle, which defines the contours of a state’s
obligation to prevent their territory to inflict extraterritorial harm, is increasingly
significant in light of the above-mentioned increase in global network connectivity. It is
with regards to this principal where the Manual’s application is flawed. However, because
of the principle’s inherent flexibility, and the unique nature of the cyber risks, there are
patches that are consistent with international law and would better serve global peace and
security.
Cite as: Colin Patrick, Debugging the Tallinn Manual 2.0’s Application of the Due
Diligence Principle to Cyber Operations, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 581 (2019).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Rapid development of the world’s cyber infrastructure is bringing
enormous change to the geopolitical order and requiring new applications of
international customary law.1 As global network connectivity increases, new
pathways open up for transboundary interactions. But so do pathways for
inflicting transboundary harm. States, terrorist organizations, hacktivists, and
other actors are exploiting this risk, causing varying levels of damage from
across the world.2 One international custom aimed at reducing these harms is
the due diligence principle—the “obligation of states to take measures to
ensure their territories are not used to the detriment of other states.”3 However,
the diffused nature of certain malicious cyber operations problematizes states’
due diligence expectations and increases the likelihood and impact of

* J.D. Candidate at the University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. I want to express to
my deepest thanks to Professor Melissa Durkee whose guidance and feedback was invaluable.
1
Riham Alkousaa, German Companies See Threefold Rise in Cyber Attacks, Study Finds, REUTERS
(Oct. 5, 2017, 8:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-germany/german-companies-seethreefold-rise-in-cyber-attacks-study-finds-idUSKBN1CA1WX.
2
Id.
3
Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE L.J. F. 68, 69 (2015),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/in-defense-of-due-diligence-in-cyberspace.
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transboundary harms. Malicious operations, like the Mirai Botnet,4 are often
decentralized and utilize networks in numerous jurisdictions, creating a
collective action problem that results in uncertainty over how the due
diligence principle is applied to cyber operations. Uncertainty which
manifests gaps for nefarious entities to exploit.
To stabilize state expectations, international law experts put forth their
application of due diligence required by states to prevent harmful cyber
operations.5 Released in 2017, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International
Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (hereafter, “The Manual”) is the work
of twenty international law experts to restate the application of international
law to the realm of cyber operations.6 While the first version of the Manual
focused solely on applying the precepts of jus in bello and jus ad bellum to
cyber operations, the second version gave particular attention to “fully
develop[ing] the peacetime law of cyber operations.”7 This included an
application of the due diligence principle to cyber operations.8
The Manual makes a strong case for why the due diligence principle is
applicable to cyber operations, and why states should abide by its mandates.
And the Manual’s application of the principle has been lauded by scholars for
its normative pronouncements.9 However, as other scholars have stated, the
Manual is just the beginning of a “long-term conversation” about due
diligence in the world of cyber operations.10 This work aims to add to that
conversation.
Drawing from the abundance of different applications of the principle,
this work argues that certain interpretations of how the principle applies may
be counter-productive to maintaining international peace and security by
underappreciating the threat of botnets and giving too much leeway to
malicious states. Rather, because of the inherent uncertainty and variability of
4
Nicky Woolf, DDoS Attack that Disrupted Internet was Largest of its Kind in History, Experts Say,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2016, 4:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/26/ddosattack-dyn-mirai-botnet.
5
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 33, cmt.
21 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017) [hereinafter, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
6
See id. at 2.
7
Schmitt, supra note 3, at 69.
8
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 30–50.
9
Ian Yuying Liu, The Due Diligence Doctrine Under Tallinn Manual 2.0, 33 COMPUTER L. & SEC.
REV. 390, 395 (2017) (praising the work of the experts as a “positive step led by scholars to delineate the
framework of international law in cyberspace”).
10
Michael J. Adams, A Warning About Tallinn 2.0… Whatever it Says, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017,
8:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/warning-about-tallinn-20-%E2%80%A6-whatever-it-says.
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the cyber risks, different frames of analytical application are necessary. This
paper provides those different frames and explains how they are consistent
with the principal and international law.
Parts II & III provide an overview of due diligence, its development
into custom, and its modern applications. Parts IV & V describe the Manual’s
application of the principle, detail flaws with the application, provide
solutions to those flaws, and explain why those solutions are consistent with
the tenets of the due diligence principle. Part VI concludes and identifies areas
for future scholarship.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE

Due diligence is customary international law.11 It requires that states
take measures to prevent their territory from being used in activities meant to
inflict extraterritorial harm.12 Failure to take such measures may result in the
state violating international law or even being found responsible for the harm,
regardless of its relative intent in carrying out the precipitating act.13 This
responsibility for the harm may potentially expose a state to
countermeasures.14 Furthermore, if the harm rises to the level of an armed
attack, it may justify a victim state’s use of force against an offending state’s
territory.15 Therefore, states have an incentive to be vigilant and minimize the
risk of harm originating from their territory.16
Due diligence, while eminently flexible in application,17 still contains
two essential elements. First, responsibility for a harm only attaches if the
state knew its territory was being used in activities to harm other states18 and
that harm crosses a severity threshold.19 Second, if knowledge exists, a state
11
See, e.g., United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887); U.N. Secretary-General, Survey of
International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of International Law Commission, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/1/Rev.1 (Feb. 1, 1949).
12
See Schmitt, supra note 3, at 69.
13
See Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., The Due Diligence Principle under International Law, 8 INT’L
COMMUNITY L. REV. 81, 91 (2006).
14
See G.A. Res. 56/83, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, at 11–12 (Jan. 28,
2002).
15
See id. at 12.
16
JOANNA KULESZA, DUE DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2016).
17
See 1 MAX PLANCK INST. FOR COMP. PUBLIC & INT’L L., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1114 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).
18
See F.V. García Amador, State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/134 & ADD.1 (Jan. 26, 1961),
http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1961_v2.pdf.
19
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 32, cmt 7.
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must take all feasible measures to prevent the harm.20 Keeping in line with the
central conceit of due diligence, these elements inform one another and are
applied flexibly based on the context.21 International legal bodies consistently
grapple with these issues and have produced extensive jurisprudence and
writings to clarify states’ obligations under the principle. Moreover, states
take it upon themselves to define due diligence obligations in several
situations.22
As noted above, flexible application is a defining characteristic of due
diligence.23 The various situations where due diligence applies evinces this
fact. For example, international adjudicative bodies have found that due
diligence may require a state to warn others of threats in their territory,24
protect foreign nationals during insurrections,25 or prevent transboundary
environmental harm.26 Likely because of this flexibility, due diligence is
subject to a wide range of interpretation.27 International adjudicative bodies
apply the principle narrowly in some contexts, only requiring minimal
measures to discharge the obligation.28 Others interpret the principle
expansively and expect significant efforts by states,29 including precautionary
duties.30 Ultimately, and because of its malleability, the extent of a state’s due
diligence obligation will require a fact-specific determination.31
A state’s due diligence obligations can also manifest through the
precautionary principle.32 In the context of environmental protection,
traditional due diligence obligations were ineffective in preventing
transboundary harm because those obligations only triggered if the harm was
20

See Garcia Amador, supra note 18, at addendum.
See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 1114.
22
See Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (Dec. 10, 1982).
23
See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 1114.
24
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 12 (Apr. 9).
25
Youmans (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 110, 112 (Gen. Claims Comm’n. 1926).
26
Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963-65 (Arbitral Trib. 1941).
27
Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, 28 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 899, 900 (2017).
28
See TIM STEPHENS & DUNCAN FRENCH, ILA STUDY GROUP ON DUE DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW SECOND REPORT 2 (2016).
29
See Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to
Activities in the International Seabed Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS Rep. 1,
¶ 122 (noting adherence to precautionary principle is part of a state’s due diligence obligation in this context).
30
See id.; Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A at 1963–65; Ling Chen, Realizing the Precautionary Principle in
Due Diligence, 25 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2016).
31
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 1114.
32
See id.; Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1963-65; Chen, supra note 30, at 4
21
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“reasonably foreseeable.”33 Since the nature of such harm was often
unforeseeable, likely because of a lack of scientific evidence, a state would
have no obligation to prevent harm that only later would be found severe.34
To fill this gap in enforcement, a precautionary obligation emerged.35 This
obligation of prevention meant states must “ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction do not harm an extraterritorial environment.”36 While a
precautionary approach has usually been confined to environmental issues, its
application has expanded to other contexts, specifically those that carry risks
similar in certainty and scope to those in international environmental law,37
including the European Union explicitly finding that due diligence obligations
includes a more general protection against threats to human health.38
III.

THE RISE AND REFINEMENT OF THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE

Originally outlined by Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth
century,39 the principle of due diligence entered international law in the
nineteenth century.40 Technological developments and increased global
awareness brought the international community closer together,41 increasing
the possibility of both states and non-state actors inflicting transboundary
damage.42 This gave rise to expanded obligations on state conduct, including
the due diligence principle.
From the tail end of the nineteenth century through World War II
(WWII), states increasingly invoked the principle when seeking redress
against one another.43 Post-WWII, the space between states continued to
decrease as the world experienced rapid technological, cultural, and
geopolitical changes.44 Unsurprisingly, states subsequently increased their
33

See Chen, supra note 30, at 4.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See Arie Trouwborst, Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law: The Relationship between the
Precautionary Principle and the Preventative Principle in International Law and Associated Questions, 2
ERASMUS L. REV. 105, 115 (2009).
38
Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, at 4, COM (2000) 1 final
(Feb. 2, 2000).
39
DUNCAN FRENCH & TIM STEPHENS, ILA STUDY GROUP ON DUE DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
FIRST REPORT 2 (2014).
40
See Barnidge, supra note 13, at 92.
41
See FRENCH & STEPHENS, supra note 39, at 2.
42
See id.
43
See Barnidge, supra note 13, at 92.
44
See id.
34
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due diligence claims against one another.45 Several international instruments
and legal decisions arose out these claims, producing an analytical framework
of the principle’s constitutive elements.
A.

Scope of the Due Diligence Principle

Due diligence obligations only attach to a state when third-parties act
within its territory to harm another state and that harm crosses a specific
threshold.46 Rephrased, a triggering actor and harm are required before any
due diligence responsibility may attach. If either a triggering actor or harm is
not present, then a state bears no due diligence obligation, even if it was aware
of the harm.47
International law has steadfastly held that third-party state action
satisfies the triggering actor condition.48 Although at one time there was an
unsettled question whether the same held true for non-state actors,49 this
question was answered affirmatively by the mid-twentieth century, and its
development is traceable through a series of international arbitrations.
The Alabama Claims Arbitration arose from United States’ claims
against the United Kingdom for violating its promise of neutrality during the
American Civil War when it allowed the Confederate Navy to construct
warships within their ports.50 To resolve these claims, the United States and
the United Kingdom brokered the Treaty of Washington.51 The Treaty of
Washington established a tribunal to adjudicate the claims and set the public
international law governing the proceedings.52 Article VI of the treaty defined
the due diligence obligation of a neutral state as rules meant to prevent its
territory from being used to cause harm by belligerents.53 The belligerent in
question, while claiming to be a sovereign state, was an insurrectionary force

45

See id.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 32, cmt 7.
47
See id.
48
See Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 20–23 (finding that even another state had laid the mines, Albania
still bore a due diligence obligation to warn).
49
See Barnidge, supra note 13, at 91–92.
50
Tom Bingham, The Alabama Claims Arbitration, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 2–9 (2005).
51
Id. at 14.
52
Id. at 15.
53
See Bingham, supra note 50, at 15–16.
46
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and not a state under international law.54 Thus, when the Tribunal determined
the United Kingdom failed to meet its due diligence obligations, it recognized
that an entity other than a state could qualify as a triggering actor. 55
The litigation on the issue of non-state actors continued, especially in
cases involving a state’s due diligence responsibility for actions of its
nationals.56 In Youmans, a tribunal found Mexico liable for harm done to an
American by Mexican nationals during a mob uprising.57 Whereas in
Sambiaggio, a commission decided whether Venezuela could be liable for
harm to an Italian national by insurrectionist revolutionaries.58 The
Commission ultimately agreed with Venezuela’s defense that they lacked
access to effective feasible measures to incur liability for the specific alleged
harms.59 However, the Tribunal did note that under other circumstances, a
state may bear responsibility if it “failed to use promptly and with appropriate
force its constituted authority” to prevent or end a harm.60
The well-known Trail Smelter Arbitration finally settled the question
of non-state actor applicability. During WWII, smoke from a privately-owned
smelter operating in Trail, British Columbia, caused extensive damage to
forests and agricultural land across the U.S.-Canadian Border.61 When farmers
and landowners objected to the pollution, the United States decided to raise
their claims with Canada.62 To resolve these disputes and calm tensions, an
arbitral tribunal was established.63 Relying on scholarly works and cases from
several domestic jurisdictions, the Tribunal determined that “under the
principles of international law . . . no state has the right to use or permit the
use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury . . . to the territory of
another.”64 Therefore, by holding Canada responsible for the pollution caused
by the privately-owned smelter, the Tribunal explicitly held that under
54
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, Preventing Diplomatic Recognition of the Confederacy, 1861–1865,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
STATE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20130828005906/http://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/Confederacy.
55
Alabama Claims of the United States of America against Great Britain, 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 130–31
(1871).
56
See Barnidge, supra note 13, at 95–98.
57
See id. at 95–96
58
See id. at 97.
59
Id. at 97–98.
60
Id. at 98.
61
Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A at 1915–16.
62
Id. at 1912
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1963–65.
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customary international law the due diligence principle is applicable to a
state’s responsibility for the actions of non-state actors within its territory.65
As of today, there is no question that non-state actors may be a triggering actor
and that several adjudicatory bodies have held states liable for failing to
prevent non-state actors from causing harms.
Unlike the triggering actor condition, what constitutes a triggering harm
is an amorphous standard and necessarily circumstance-specific.66 Generally,
actions resulting in “serious adverse consequences” will justify the principal,67
while minimal injuries will not.68 Noticeably however, there is a wide chasm
between those two poles, especially considering “severe adverse
consequences” is a “fairly high threshold.”69 This high standard is reasonable
in situations where the harm’s impact is reasonably foreseeable.70
Of course, there are myriad contexts where the degree of a harm, or
even its existence, is unknown to the state. Thus to effectuate the purpose and
intent of the principle, states expanded the concept of the triggering harm
beyond just its foreseeable consequences and considered whether there is a
risk of serious or irreversible damage from the uncertain harm.71 This
expansion was born out of a recognition that even though a harm’s impact was
uncertain, the risk of that harm, when reasonably foreseeable that it will occur,
ought to trigger due diligence obligations.72
However, in certain circumstances, where a harm’s impact is
unknowable or imprecisely understood, but may be so severe or irreversible,
it attaches due diligence obligations on a state even if the eventual totality of
that harm would not otherwise trigger the principle.73 Consequently, these
harms attach their own form of obligation.74 This distinction between harms

65

Id. at 1965–66.
See id. at 1963–65.
67
Id. at 1965.
68
See id. at 1963 (discussing the Federal Court of Switzerland’s decision involving a shooting range
near the border of two cantons).
69
KULESZA, supra note 16, at 244.
70
NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES
74–75 (2002).
71
See id.; Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 151–
52 (2001).
72
Int’l Law Comm’n., supra note 71, at 152.
73
Int’l Law Comm’n., supra note 71, at 155 (recognizing the flexibility inherent in the due diligence
principle may require states take “abundant caution”).
74
See Trouwborst, supra note 37, at 116.
66
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triggering preventative measures and those triggering precautionary ones is
discussed later in this piece.
The scope of the due diligence principle, in terms of whose actions it
covers, is broad and settled. Regardless of the actor, states are expected to
conduct due diligence to ensure those actions do not harm other states.
However, what can be a triggering harm is more often narrowly defined, and
traditionally requires “serious adverse consequences” before responsibility
attaches to the territorial state. Although, when the context involves unique
harms, the flexibility of the principle may justify a lower threshold to uphold
the purpose of due diligence.
B.

The Knowledge Element

A state violates its due diligence obligations only if it has knowledge
that its territory is being used for activities that harm other states.75 However,
international courts interpret this knowledge requirement broadly, finding
either actual or constructive knowledge can constitute a state’s awareness of
harmful actions.76 In 1949, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided the
Corfu Channel Case. This case arose after British warships struck mines while
passing through the Corfu Strait off the coast of Albania.77 The British, after
examining several mines pulled from the strait, believed Albania mined the
strait prior to the warships passing.78 Albania rejected this accusation,
contending the mines “may have been floating mines, coming from old
minefields in the vicinity, or magnetic ground mines, magnetic moored mines,
or German GR mines.”79 After determining that the British passage was
innocent, the ICJ held Albania liable for the damage done to the British
ships.80 While Albania’s actual knowledge of the mines may have been in
doubt, the totality of circumstances led the ICJ to find that Albania must have,
or at least should have, known mines were laid in the strait.81 Reasoning that
a victim state may be incapable of establishing iron-clad proof of actual
knowledge of the offending state, the majority opinion determined that the use
of indirect facts and evidence, combined with the offending state’s exclusive
control of the territory, can be sufficient to satisfy the knowledge requirement
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

See Amador, supra note 18, at addendum.
Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 20.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 20.
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of due diligence.82 Consequently, due diligence obligations could attach if the
state knew or should have known their territory was being used in activities
to harm other states.83
C.

The Feasible Measures Element

The feasible measures required from a state are dependent on both the
nature of the harm and the ability of the state to combat it.84 Weaker states
may have access to fewer feasible measure than their stable and economicallypowerful counterparts.85 Moreover, whether the harm requires a preventative
or precautionary approach informs what actions must be taken.86 Ultimately,
what feasible measures a state is required to perform is a context-driven
analysis, specifically considering the capacity of a state and the specifics of
the harm occurring. These concepts are explored in a set of ICJ decisions and
scholarly works.
In the Tehran Hostages Case, the ICJ delineated between a state’s
negligence and lack of resources.87 The ICJ determined Iran’s failure to take
“appropriate steps” to protect the United States embassy and staff was not due
to lack of ability or access to appropriate means, but rather constituted
negligence on behalf of the government because there were reasonable
measures which could have been undertaken.88 While finding Iran failed to
take feasible measures, the Tehran Hostages judgment intimated that a lack
of resources capable of addressing the specific harm may render a state unable
to take feasible measures.
The Paramilitary Activities judgment confirmed this proposition. In
that case, the ICJ found Nicaragua did not breach its due diligence obligation
by failing to prevent the flow of arms into El Salvador.89 The court noted “the
geographical obstacles . . . and the intrinsic character of any clandestine arms
traffic” indicated the arms trafficking could be “carried on successfully
without any complicity from governmental authorities, and even when they
82

Id. at 18.
See Barnidge, supra note 13, at 105–06.
84
FRENCH & STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 3.
85
Id.
86
See Trouwborst, supra note 37, at 116.
87
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3,
¶ 63 (May 24).
88
See id. at ¶ 63, 66.
89
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, ¶ 157 (June 27).
83
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seek to put a stop to it.”90 They reasoned that Nicaragua, a developing nation
experiencing civil unrest, was not capable of carrying out measures to end the
trafficking of arms through their territory.91 Combined, these cases stand for
the proposition that what is feasibly required from a state is determined by the
capacity of that state to enact those measures within specific circumstances.
Beyond a state’s capabilities, the measures they must take to discharge
their due diligence obligations are dependent on the nature of the harm. As
noted in the above section, triggering harms can be conceived as those
necessitating prevention and those mandating precaution.92 When the exact
consequences of a harm are known, it triggers preventative measures.93
Whereas if the consequences are uncertain, but potentially severe or
irreversible, the measures required are classified as precautionary. 94 Professor
Nicolas de Sadeleer identifies the key distinction between the two as the
“degree of uncertainty surrounding the probability of risk,”95 and notes that
“the lower the margin of uncertainty, the greater the justification for
intervention as a means of prevention rather than in the name of precaution.
By contrast, precaution is used when scientific research has not yet reached a
stage that allows the veil of uncertainty to be lifted.”96 While the concept of
precaution originated in the international environmental law context, the
underlying logic of threat uncertainty and its effect on state obligations is
transferable to other contexts.97 The question of uncertainty evolved away
from one that is purely focused on scientifically ascertainable risks, such as
pollution or overfishing, to one that focuses on the uncertainty of known risk
whose contours are not easily ascertainable,98 such as the effects of nuclear
weapons testing99 and dam building100 on human health. Thus, in determining
the extent and character of the measures required from the state, the certainty
of a particularized risk is an essential part of the calculus.
When a state bears due diligence obligations, the nature of those
obligations and the capacity of the state informs what measures are feasible
90

Id.
See id. at ¶ 157–58 (comparing the abilities of the Central American nation to that of the United
States and concluding it is unreasonable to expect Nicaragua be able to know and deter the flow of arms.).
92
See Trouwborst, supra note 37, at 116.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
DE SADELEER, supra note 70, at 74–75.
96
Id.
97
See Trouwborst, supra note 37, at 117.
98
Id.
99
Nuclear Weapons (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22).
100
Gabcikovo-Nagymoros (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
91
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and thus necessary. One must analyze the situation holistically to understand
what should be required of a state.
THE TALLINN MANUAL 2.0’S APPLICATION OF THE DUE DILIGENCE
PRINCIPLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS

IV.

Due diligence came in the second iteration of the Manual. The first
version of the Manual focused almost exclusively on the rules of war
regarding cyber operations.101 This left out several key peacetime rules for
cyber operations, including the due diligence principle.102
Chapter Two of the Manual lays out the application of the due diligence
principle to cyber operations. Consisting of two rules, this chapter explains
why the due diligence principle applies to cyber operations, under what
circumstances the principle applies, and the measures needed to discharge the
obligations of the principle.103
A.

Rule 6 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0

Rule 6 sets out the general principle for due diligence obligations over
cyber operations.104 It states that “[a] state must exercise due diligence in not
allowing its territory . . . to be used for cyber operations that might affect the
rights of, and produce serious adverse consequences for, other states.”105 The
commentary to this rule notes the principle’s application to cyber operations
is lex lata.106 The Manual found that, as the principle is custom, it applies to
new contexts and technologies “absent a legal exclusion therefrom.” 107 The
Manual could not find such a legal exclusion, and therefore the principle
applies to cyber operations.108
The commentary of Rule 6 details the principle’s application to the
cyber operations of non-state actors. Only cyber operations attributable to a
state can violate another state’s sovereignty or contravene the prohibition on
101

Schmitt, supra note 3, at 70.
Id.
103
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 5, at 30–50.
104
Id. at 30.
105
Id. (The rule also encompasses territory or cyber infrastructure under a state’s control.).
106
Id. at 31, cmt. 3–4 (acknowledging, but rejecting, a view that the due diligence is not customary
international law).
107
Id. at 31, cmt. 4.
108
Id.
102
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use of force109 and such operations are only attributable to a state if they “result
in serious adverse consequence and . . . affect a right of the target state.”110 If
a non-state actor launched a cyber operation that violated the sovereignty of
another state, to the level of serious adverse consequences, the territorial state
would bear a due diligence obligation, regardless of whether the operation
would be a per se violation of international law.111
Concerning the triggering harm, the Manual adopts the standard of
“serious adverse consequences.”112 While recognizing the harm threshold is
an open question, the Manual notes this standard was adopted by analogy from
the “context of international environmental law.”113 The Manual declined to
adopt the minority viewpoint that a lower harm threshold, such as
“significant” or “substantial” adverse consequences, was appropriate.114
Furthermore, the Manual rejected the idea that an aggregation of cyber
incidents, such as those caused by Botnets, can constitute serious adverse
consequences.115 Thus, even if a state’s territory is used as part of a larger
attack that, in totality, would cross threshold of serious adverse consequences,
no due diligence obligation will attach unless the amount of harm specifically
attributable to a state is sufficient to cross that threshold.116
Beyond establishing the general scope of the principle, Rule 6 outlines
the due diligence knowledge requirement for cyber operations. In line with
Corfu Channel, the Manual states the Rule encompasses both actual and
constructive knowledge.117 The Manual does, however, recognize that
advances in malware and other cyber capabilities may render proving
constructive knowledge extremely difficult.118 Regardless of this difficulty,
the Manual states the constructive knowledge standard does not mandate any
obligation to monitor the state’s cyber infrastructure.119 Instead, a state is only
required to act as some hypothetical “reasonable state” based on the
circumstances, and therefore constructive knowledge may be imputed to a
109
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111
112
113
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state only when, if under the circumstances, the state should have discovered
the operation.120
In sum, Rule 6 of the Manual finds that there is no legal exclusion of
the due diligence principle with regards to cyber operations and, as customary
international law, is therefore applicable to this context. Borrowing from
international environmental law, the Manual adopts sets a standard for the
triggering harm and does not consider aggregation when calculating the extent
of the harm attributable to a state. However, as discussed below, the Manual
declined to adopt international environmental law’s precautionary approach
to threats. Finally, while the Manual recognizes the difficulty of establishing
constructive knowledge, it does not modify the contours of the triggering
harm with the respect to the certainty needed to attach obligations.
B.

Rule 7 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0

Rule 7 lays out the feasible measures element of the principle. The Rule
“requires a state to use all measures that are feasible in the circumstances to
put an end to cyber operations that affect a right of, and produce serious
adverse consequences for, other states.”121 Consistent with the reasoning in
Tehran Hostages and Paramilitary Activities, the Manual recognizes that
feasible measures are coextensive with the “readily available measures” of the
territorial state.122 Further, failure to take readily available measures
encompasses both the failure to exhaust available measures and state inaction,
such as ignoring an identified non-state actor cyber operation harming the
sovereignty of another state.123
The Manual states that what constitutes readily available measures will
differ based on the stage of the operation.124 Specifically, the Manual
distinguishes between cyber operations underway and those not yet launched.
With regards to operations underway, the Manual is unequivocal. Once the
territorial state has knowledge of the operation, it must “exhaust all feasible
measures to terminate it.”125 Conversely, when dealing with an unlaunched
attack, a state need only take feasible measures when they are reasonably sure
120
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123
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125
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that material steps have been taken to carry out the attack.126 Accordingly, if
a state is aware of an unlaunched attack, such as a plan to steal sensitive data,
its obligations are focused on whether the attack is possible and imminent.
However, if the attack is underway, its obligations shift to ending the attack.
In either case, the attack must also rise to the triggering harm threshold
outlined in Rule 6 before feasible measures are required.127
While the due diligence principle requires termination of known cyber
operations, the Manual recognizes that states have significant discretion in
how to terminate such operations.128 For example, a state may choose to
terminate the operation and apprehend those responsible, or inform the
targeted state of the operation.129 Either way, the state would have discharged
its due diligence obligations.130 However, the principle does recognize that the
qualities of a state may affect its capacity to enact feasible measures. A weak
state will assuredly have less capacity than a strong state.131 Although, a weak
state may be required to hire a private entity to terminate the operation.132
Finally, the principle may allow a state to delay termination of an operation,
if that delay would result in a more effective and definitive termination.133
Under the Manual’s interpretation, states are never required to enact
general preventative measures to discharge a due diligence obligation.134
Following the reasoning employed in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion, the Manual determined states are not required to generally prevent
cyber operations launched from their territory, but rather combat specific
instances of such cyber operations.135 As the Manual puts it, “the term
‘prevent’ in this context means ‘stop.’”136 Therefore, a state’s due diligence
obligations do not include any requirement to remove legal barriers on
enacting feasible measures,137 strengthen the security of its
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cyberinfrastructure,138 or improve its knowledge capacity.139 Even if a state is
aware that its network is vulnerable to being conscripted by cyber threats or
has been used by malicious entities in the past, unless there is a known threat,
a state does not bear any due diligence obligations.
Further, the Manual, building from its rejection of general preventative
measures, also rejects the idea that general precautionary measures, such as
monitoring one’s cyber infrastructure, may be mandated by the principle.140
Oddly, the Manual characterizes this measure as preventative,141 despite the
measure having more in common with precautionary logic.142 The Manual
does state, however, that if a state monitors its cyber infrastructure for threats,
it would “bear on whether it has knowledge of any cyber operations directed
at another state within its territory.”143
According to the Manual, what feasible measures are needed for a state
to discharge its due diligence obligation is context dependent. The type and
stage of the operation, the state’s capacity, any exercise of discretion by the
state, and other factors will determine the extent of a state’s readily available
measures. However, general preventative measures are not required as a state
is only responsible for specific and perceivable cyber operations. This blanket
rejection includes any general precautionary measures, including those that
may reduce a state’s uncertainty over the existence of a specific cyber
operation.
FLAWS WITH THE TALLINN MANUAL 2.0’S APPLICATION OF THE DUE
DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE TO NON-STATE ACTOR CYBER OPERATIONS

V.

There are flaws with the application of the Manual which may threaten
international peace and security. Two flaws are notable and the focus of this
section. First, rejecting the theory of aggregation when determining the
character of the triggering harm fails to cover Botnet operations. Second, the
wholesale rejection of general precautionary measures as an obligation creates
perverse incentives for states. These flaws, in tandem, deteriorate the
principle’s effectiveness and threaten global security. Fortunately, there are
138
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potential fixes to these flaws that are consistent with the corpus of due
diligence jurisprudence.
A.

Flaw One: Failure to Incorporate Aggregation
Calculating the Triggering Harm

when

The Manual declined to adopt the theory of aggregation when
determining the character of the triggering harm. 144 Thus, even if a state’s
territory is used in committing an operation that, if aggregated, would create
“severe adverse consequences,” that state has not violated its due diligence
obligations unless the impact attributable to its territory alone led to “severe
adverse consequences.”145 While it is undoubtedly true that some attacks will
cross the requisite triggering threshold without the need for aggregation,146
this interpretation, as the Manual implicitly admits, would exclude any state
responsibility for Botnet operations.147
A Botnet operation is when a malicious party takes control of Internet
of Things (IoT) devices148—which can be anything from a washing machine
to a lamp to a jet engine149—and uses them to launch large-scale Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.150 Botnet operations can originate from
more than one state151 and take over IoT devices in even more.152 Thus, the
use of Botnets diffuses the means of attack across a multitude of states, and
thereby diffusing the individual responsibility of each states. As such, the
harm attributable to any given state would likely not reach the high threshold
of serious adverse consequences. With no responsibility attached, no
obligations manifest.153 This creates a situation where a targeted state is
144
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subjected to enormous harm but possesses no peaceful means sufficient to
redress its grievance. It either must endure the damage or resort to legally
unjustifiable means. Both scenarios are untenable and threaten international
peace and security.
This is not some metaphysical threat, but rather an impending
catastrophe for the international community. During October 2016, the Mirai
Botnet shutdown cyber infrastructure giant Dyn in what was likely the largest
DDoS attack in history.154 The attack caused millions in economic damage
and violated the sovereignty of multiple states.155 All the more worrisome is
that the mastermind behind the Mirai malware was not the director of a state’s
cyber organ or a terrorist organization, but instead a group of college-aged
kids trying to scam Minecraft servers.156 This disturbing trend has continued
with the Reaper botnet.157 Building off Mirai, the Reaper operation has
infected IoT devices around the world, and while it has yet to be used in any
DDoS attacks, there are predictions that it could eclipse the scope and damage
of the Mirai attack against Dyn.158
At the heart of the Botnet problems is a collective action issue.159 States
may believe protecting their cyber infrastructure against Botnets is the right
thing to do,160 but know that successful prevention requires collective
action.161 Therefore, states who act alone may suffer some negative externality
and so would be otherwise unwilling to act without some assurance of
reciprocity.162
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Aggregation resolves this problem. Under aggregation, a state would
bear responsibility for the part of the triggering harm attributable to it.163 Thus,
responsibility and potential punishments for non-compliance are attached to
each culpable state. This increases the incentives for states to act, and, in
combination with the inherent benefit of Botnet prevention, may outweigh
any negative externality associated with such an action. Furthermore, initial
state action would function as the assurance of reciprocity needed by skeptical
states.164 This could portend cooperation amongst the states and lead to the
collective solutions necessary for effective Botnet prevention.165
Admittedly, whether aggregation is consistent with due diligence is an
open question. As noted earlier, there was a minority view among the experts
that aggregation is appropriate.166 They analogize that composite cyber
operations, such as using Botnets, are sufficiently similar to composite armed
attacks.167 This is when a set of individual operations, if treated as composite,
rises to the level of armed attack, and may be attributable to a single originator
or multiple originators if they are acting in concert.168 Admittedly, armed
attacks require intent to harm by the originators,169 and therefore the two
concepts are not perfect analogs. However, the hallmarks of due diligence are
flexibility and reasonableness,170 and the failure of the principle to cover
Botnet operations because of a rigid application seems eminently
unreasonable.
In addition to the analogy to composite armed attacks, adopting
aggregation is justified by the uncertainty of the harm created by Botnets. As
discussed above, when a harm poses an uncertain risk that may incur severe
or irreversible damage, the concept of what constitutes a triggering harm may
be adjusted to meet that context.171 With Botnets, uncertainty exists both in
the extent of impact and the extent of the compromised IoT device network.
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In several environmental contexts, such an abundance of uncertainty justifies
a precautionary approach in conceptualizing the triggering harm.172
While this context is obviously not within the environmental gambit,
the Manual’s adoption by analogy of “severe adverse consequences” from
international environmental law173 provides further reasoning for adopting
aggregation. By failing to adopt aggregation—which, as discussed above, is
the precautionary approach in this context—the Manual selectively adopts
“severe adverse consequences.” This selective adoption is inconsistent with
international environmental law because it would exclude the precautionary
logic embedded in the constitution of that context’s triggering harm.174 Thus,
adopting the triggering harm standard from international environmental harm
not only legitimizes incorporating aggregation, but in fact, seems to demand
it.
B.

Flaw Two: Failure to Require Precautionary Knowledge
Building Measures

The Manual contends preventative measures are not required under the
principle.175 This includes precautionary knowledge building measures, like
monitoring and “other steps designed to alert authorities to misuse of cyber
infrastructure located on the state’s territory.”176 Furthermore, the Manual also
recognizes that a state’s knowledge, or constructive knowledge, of a harmful
cyber operation in its territory may be impossible to prove if they lack capacity
or the operation is highly complex.177 However, the difficulty in determining
constructive knowledge, combined with the lack of knowledge building
measures, undermines the effectiveness of the principle. Malintent states
could capitalize on this opening by implementing a policy of plausible
deniability when it comes to cyber operations in their territory. Without an
obligation of precautionary knowledge building measures, these states are free
to exploit this loophole, fully aware that any alleged violations of their
obligations are extraordinarily difficult to prove. And without some
diplomatic framework, the harmed state is likely constrained to responses that
172
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escalate the situation and threaten global peace—such as retaliatory hacks or
“hackbacks”178—or that are wholly insufficient because they cannot leverage
an external source of pressure.179
An imposition of precautionary knowledge building measures rectifies
this problem. By requiring states to undertake such measures, there are now
opportunities for harmed states to hold accountable those states that either
conducted the attack through a covert cyber organ or allowed a third-party to
conduct the attack.180 For example, if a state is harmed by a cyber operation it
may allege that another state failed to perform the expected knowledge
building measures to prevent its territory from being used in the operation. If
the accused state cannot establish that it undertook those measures, then it has
failed its due diligence obligations and the international legal system may be
used to resolve the problem before it escalates. Moreover, if the accused state
proclaims that they executed such measures, then the harmed state has much
stronger argument for constructive knowledge. Even the Manual implies that
when a state undertakes knowledge building measures it is more likely to be
found to have constructive knowledge of harmful operations.181 Therefore,
under either scenario, a malicious state is no longer capable of exploiting a
due diligence obligation gap that allows its territory to be a launch pad for
cyber operations.
Requiring knowledge building measures is consistent with the object
and purpose of the due diligence principle. The flexibility inherent in due
diligence allows for the imposition of precautionary duties if the context
requires.182 A prime example is the precautionary principle in international
environmental law. Environmental harms are often as uncertain as they are
severe.183 Therefore, not obligating states to adopt a risk averse stance could
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result in irreversible damage.184 Adherence to the precautionary principle is
thus necessary to make a state’s environmental due diligence responsibilities
meaningful.185 As such, there is precedent for requiring precautionary
measures as part of a state’s due diligence obligations when the failure to do
so could reasonably defeat the object and purpose of the principle.
Furthermore, the way the triggering harm should be understood
strengthens the case of a knowledge building expectation. Under aggregation,
a state bears responsibility for the portion of a qualifying cyber operation
attributable to it.186 However, unless knowledge is also attributable to the
state, it likely will not incur any obligations.187 Therefore, without knowledge
building measures, even under a theory of aggregation, a state may avoid any
due diligence obligations.
Precautionary measures are likely necessary to ensure states cannot
shirk their due diligence responsibilities with impunity when it suits them.
Specifically, the lack of precautionary knowledge building expectations
allows states to maintain plausible deniability in perpetuity without
repercussions. Certainly, this would defeat the object and purpose of the due
diligence principle. Moreover, precautionary knowledge building measures
are necessary to ensure that severe or irreversible harms are put in check.
Undoubtedly, a state’s capacity will dictate the extent of the required
precautionary measures. Both the strength of the state and its commitments to
internet privacy may constrain what feasible measures are readily available.
If a state lacks the technical expertise, or the ability to acquire it, to conduct
precautionary measures, then it may have a legitimate reason for having no
due diligence obligations. However, with the rapid growth of global
technological acumen, the larger concern is how states with commitments to
internet privacy are able to balance that interest with the need for
precautionary measures. No doubt the context will be determinative, but there
are some avenues already available to states. States are free to inspect their
government-run and critical cyber infrastructure systems for malware. By
scanning their own systems, states can, at the very least, get an idea of whether
their IoT devices, and thus potentially others, are being used in a Botnet
184
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operation. This idea has already been discussed by the United States.188
Furthermore, software industry groups have offered up a number of possible
approaches to improve knowledge building precautionary measures that aim
to balance privacy with the need for secure cyber infrastructure. 189 As such,
there are opportunities for states to cooperate with private business, which
would allow them to carry out knowledge building measures in a way that
does not run afoul of their internet privacy commitments. Ultimately, a state’s
capability to perform knowledge building measures may be difficult to
ascertain, but that cannot be a reason to avoid expecting such an obligation in
the first place.
Either of the above flaws may render any due diligence principle for
cyber operations ineffective in maintaining international peace and security.
Further, if the principle is ineffectual, then states may not implement it in
practice, which vitiates any benefits the principle could accrue.190 By
modifying the principle in the ways explained above, due diligence
obligations can be effective in preserving global order while being consistent
with international law.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS

The Manual’s interpretation of the due diligence principle is a great
opening salvo to what must be a long-term conversation about state
responsibility in the cyber world. However, there are flaws in the Manual’s
interpretation of due diligence that could open the door to threats to global
stability. Fortunately, any “bugs” in the Manual’s application can be fixed.
Through the adoption of aggregation and precautionary knowledge building
measures, the due diligence principle for cyber operations would be an
indispensable tool in maintaining international peace and security.
Moving forward with this research requires an examination of state
practices to see how states are responding to the scenarios at the core of the
problems with the Manual’s application. The litany of Botnet attacks and
other malicious cyber operations are creating a bevy of state actions. Delving
188
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into that will be essential in determining the full extent of the due diligence
principle for cyber operations.

